Weakened State
By the mid 1980s the Stalinist era economic planning and one party political systems of the Soviet Union were beginning to show their age and their propensity for economic failure, administrative inefficiency, and declining political legitimacy (White, 1990). The main economic and political institutions as well as it systems dated back to the infrastructure constructed by Stalin in the late1920s and the 1930s. The collectivisation of agriculture and industrialisation had been achieved at great human cost, with political obedience and loyalty to the Communists counting for more than efficiency or ability to do their jobs. The Soviet Union had suffered horrendous losses during the Second World War which were partially compensated by the gaining of satellite states in Central and Eastern Europe (Gaddis, 2005, p.11).
Gorbachev's Reforms
The attempts of Gorbachev to reform the Soviet Union would end in disaster due to the way in which the reforms were implemented. Gorbachev and his politburo colleagues regarded reform of the Soviet economy as their main priority. After all they reasoned that if they could not salvage the economy they would not be able to salvage the Soviet Union, as it would be too weak to continue as a superpower, and perhaps even as a state (Hobsbawm, 1994, p.475). Gorbachev decided that the best way to fund economic reform was to drastically reduce the Soviet Union’s military involvement abroad, by deciding to withdraw Soviet forces from Central and Eastern Europe as well as effectively ending the Cold War with the United States (Evans & Newnham, 1998, p.207). The Soviet Union effectively gave away its dominance of Central and Eastern Europe to save a few billion roubles. The ease with which Gorbachev allowed Central and Eastern Europe to go its own way was an indication that his regime had lost its belief in the legitimacy of Marxist ideology.
The Role of Nationalism
The collapse of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe convinced nationalists in some of the Soviet republics that independence was obtainable, and they that might be able to achieve it peacefully. They believed that was increasingly likely as Gorbachev seemed to lack the will or nerve to use violence to maintain the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union (Pipes, 2001, p.88).
The KGB still had 480,000 staff to repress and detain dissident elements of the population, whilst the Soviet Army still had millions of soldiers available to deal with secessionist republics and opposition movements had Gorbachev wanted to use them (Pipes, 2001, p.85).
Bibliography
Gaddis J L, (2005) The Cold War, Penguin, London
Hobsbawm, E (1994) Age of Extremes, the Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991, Michael Joseph, London
James H, (2003) Europe Reborn – A History, 1914 – 2000, Pearson Longman, Harlow
Rayner E, & Stapley R, (2006) History Debunked, Sutton Publishing, Stroud
White S, (1990) Gorbachev in power, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
