The CIA, ISI, and Mujahideen, 1979-1992
The Makeup of Afghan Resistance Groups to Soviet Occupation
May 8, 2009
The CIA mission in Afghanistan aimed to trouble consolidation efforts folllowing the Soviet invasion of 1979. But the CIA decided early on that proxies would be used, and contacts would be indirect. Pakistan's ISI would be the intermediary between the CIA and the mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan.
The main mujahideen were the Peshawar-based group of seven. They were supplied and funded by CIA and Saudi intelligence, and directed and monitored by Pakistan's ISI. Of the seven, four were thought to be fundamentalists, three were moderates.
These groups were at best loosely organized, at worst openly fighting each other for access to supplies and regional influence. May 1985 marked the closest leaguing together of the Peshawar-based resistance, when Pakistani military leader Mohummed Zia ul Haq invited the leaders together to form the Afghan Alliance.
The Boiling Pot
When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan - having lost half its territory eight years previously in a war with India - was in no condition to overtly threaten the USSR. Tight control over the mujahideen was essential to avoid Soviet reprisals on Pakistani soil. As Zia ul Haq oft-repeated about the Afghan resistance, “We must keep the pot boiling at a certain temperature. We must not allow it to boil over.”
Client-Patron Relations
ISI acted as the funnel of American and Saudi aid and supplies, and Pakistan carefully guarded this warlord-making influence. ISI supported fundamentalists for four reasons: personal relations; fighting efficiency; lack of affiliation with the Afghan aristocracy, monarchy, or previous governments; and to counter radicalizing effects of Saudi and Arab aid.
The principal recipients of ISI largesse were, in order of most aid received, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani, and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. These men were fundamentalists leaders of Hizb, Jamiat, and Ittehad-e-Islami, respectively. Hekmatyar received roughly half of all joint American-Saudi funding; Rabbani about one-sixth.
Hekmatyar the Mujahideen
Hekmatyar received more aid than any other mujahideen, but not because he was a ruthlessly efficient Soviet killer from the beginning. Already in 1975 he was a confidant of fellow Pushtun Brigadier General Naseerullah Babar, supervisor of Pakistan’s secret military training of over 5,000 Afghan exiles, including Hekmetyar. When worried about being sandwiched between two more powerful states, India and Russia, trust carries great weight: showering unaffiliated factions with largesse allowed Pakistan more maneuverability to sculpt Afghan politics in its own image.
Moderates and ISI
Because moderates had close connections with the aristocracy, monarchy, and/or previous governments, Pakistan was less interested in cooperating with them. When moderate groups complained about lack of support, ISI replied that it was because they did not perform as well on the field of battle.
By no later than 1986, up to $25 million per month of Saudi and Arab private aid had begun to choose resistance winners and losers, which had the effect of radicalizing the resistance according to ISI’s geopolitical interests and Saudi Whabbist theological interests.
According to Steve Coll, “By the late 1980s ISI had effectively eliminated all the secular, leftist, and royalist political parties that had first formed when Afghan refugees fled communist rule.”
CIA Seeks Direct Influence
Not having joined the Afghan political fray in any meaningful way in the formative years, the best CIA could hope for in the later years was to unilaterally support a couple dozen ragtag resistance fighters. CIA’s most successful unilateral client was Massoud, the Lion of Panjshir.
Massoud fought well against the Soviets in the first few years. After he agreed to a ceasefire in 1983, however, ISI and CIA became suspicious of his fighting style and goals, and thus ceased funding him. It was not until later in the war that CIA was able to forgo Pakistan’s terms of engagement and consistently supply Massoud directly. CIA funding allowed Massoud to challenge for post-war power, which was of import to the goals of ousting Najibullah and eliminating Russian influence.
Soviet Occupation Forces
By 1985 the Soviet 40th Army had grown to about 120,000 strong, while the mujahideen had more than 250,000 irregular and regular fighters. The Soviets’ scorched earth terror tactics on civilian populations, heavily armored MI-24D attack helicopters, and Spetsnaz troops began to take a heavy toll. Flying supplies in - following the construction of modestly-sized air bases at the seven military districts in Afghanistan - helped the Soviets neutralize resistance fighters.
Beginning of the End
Since mujahideen were most successful at disrupting automobile-borne supply lines and performed poorly against Soviet aerial forces and Spetsnaz crack troops, CIA introduced American weapons systems, via ISI. As a consequence, by 1986 on the ground casualties and mounting air vulnerability led the Kremlin to look for an exit strategy.
Sources:
Riaz Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot: Negotiating the Soviet Withdrawal, Durham, N.C.: Duke, 1991
Charles G. Cogan, “Partners in Time: The CIA and Afghanistan since 1979,” World Policy Journal 10, no. 2 (Summer 1993)
Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, New York: Penguin Press, 2004
