Soviet Influence in Afghanistan During the 1970s

How Soviet Political Influence Ended in Military Invasion

May 8, 2009

The political situation in Afghanistan deteriorated in the late 1970s. By 1979 it was all but untenable. Soviet political influence gave rise to military invasion.

After the coup that overthrew Daoud in 1978, the balance of power in Afghanistan involved two key actors: Nur Muhammad Taraki, anti-monarchist and president, and Hafizullah Amin, coup leader and deputy prime minister. The Kremlin supported Taraki and was suspicious of Amin’s possible ties to the CIA, but Amin’s power base resided in the Afghan military. In such a political climate the regime’s “strongman” was more inclined to hold the reins of power.

According to Abdul Qarim Misaq, a Hazara and Khalq Minister of Finance between 1978 and 1979: "Amin was a communist. But he was a special sort of communist, like Stalin; he loved Stalin very much and tried to emulate him. He was also a Pushtun nationalist. He did everything to inflate his own personality cult; moreover, he desired fame not just inside Afghanistan but throughout the world. His ambitions truly knew no limits."

Tightening Grip on the Levers of Power

As de facto ruler, Amin began to tighten his grip on the reigns of power. By the end of 1978, the Khalq had purged government. Of 105 central government posts, Khalqs held 90, including all Politburo and other key posts. The emulation of Soviet secular reforms against regional, Islamist, and tribal traditions, namely the new government’s inefficient land redistribution policy and Kabul’s use of inexperienced bureaucrats to pry into intimate family and tribal matters, only further alienated the populace.

1979: Falling Apart at the Seams

Throughout 1979 the Taraki-Amin regime faced growing domestic and foreign pressure, which led to increased Soviet military commitments. Unorganized low-level resistances simmered in 24 of 28 provinces. The foreign pressure of loosely organized Islamic fundamentalists also contributed to further disunity and growing anarchy. Later known as the mujahideen, these fundamentalists from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere were recruiting guerrilla fighters from fertile soil among the Afghan refugee populations in Iran (60,000) and Pakistan (400,000).

In February, American Ambassador Adolph Dubs was kidnapped and subsequently killed in the botched rescue attempt. In March, the 17th Infantry Division in Herat rebelled, which led to the slaughter of dozens of Soviet citizens and advisors and about 20,000 Afghans.

Finally, as early as July, the CIA had begun to stir up trouble in Afghanistan, evidenced by Operation Cyclone. The CIA was given $500,000 to spend on propaganda and psychological operations, as well as goods for the rebels. The operation mainly consisted of distributing Korans to Central Asians, attempting to radicalize them into fomenting rebellion.

A Soviet Perspective

According to newly appointed Soviet Ambassador Fikrat Tabeev’s assessment in December 1979: 'There was a real danger of a counter-revolutionary coup under the banner of Islamic fundamentalism. They had accumulated great strength by then. On the contrary, Kabul had been weakened. The army after Amin’s purges and reprisals was decapitated. The clergy had been alienated. The peasants were against [the regime]. So were the tribes, who had suffered from Amin. There were just a handful of sycophants left around Amin who, like parrots, repeated after him various idiocies about ‘building socialism’ and ‘the dictatorship of the proletariat’. The so-called ‘Kunar grouping’ of the insurgents created in the east was capable of capturing Kabul within 24 hours.'

Invasion: An American Perspective

On Christmas Eve 1979 about 75,000 Red Army troops marched into Afghanistan, invited by Amin. Two days later Amin was killed by Soviet Special Forces and Babrak Karmal (r. 1979-1986) was placed in power. Upon hearing the news, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote to President Carter: “We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War.”

Amin Saikal, Modern Afghanistan: History of Struggle and Survival, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004

Samina Ahmed, “The Crisis of State Legitimacy,” Afghanistan: Past, Present, & Future, Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies, 1997

Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, New York: Penguin Press, 2004

Raymond Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994

The copyright of the article Soviet Influence in Afghanistan During the 1970s in Russian/Ukrainian/Belarus History is owned by Paul Andrews. Permission to republish Soviet Influence in Afghanistan During the 1970s in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.