CIA Mission, Money, and Rhetoric in Afghanistan
Funding and Support of Covert Operations, 1979-1992
May 8, 2009
From 1979 to 1984 the CIA reluctantly carried out its mission in Afghanistan, fomenting rebellion by subcontract to foil the Soviet occupation. During this time, the Pakistan's ISI recruited and trained mujahideen, determined allies, and shaped Afghan politics, favoring international Islamists over Pushtun nationalists, monarchists, and aristocrats.
"Mules, Money, Mortars"
The CIA mission consisted mainly of supplying “mules, money, and mortars.” It focused on logistics and minimized contacts with Afghans. For example, Warsaw Pact weapons were also obtained through CIA ties with Egypt, Turkey, Poland, and China. One of a few unilateral operations inside Afghanistan was the shipping of commandeered Soviet weapons to America for examination, which saved millions of dollars in R&D investment.
Money, That's What I Want
The CIA had control over all official Saudi money entering Afghanistan for covert operations, which, after July 1980, matched American funding dollar for dollar. In 1980, American funding reached $30 million; in 1981, aid was between $30 and $50 million. According to Station Chief Hart, by 1983 the CIA’s program had become highly cost effective. For every $1 the United States put into Afghanistan, it cost the Soviets $8 to $10.
From 1984 to 1989 the CIA was awash in money and goaded to action by President Reagan, CIA Director William Casey, and Representative Charlie Wilson. In 1984 funding reached $200 million, surpassing the combined totals of all previous years. With Wilson’s intense interest in the mujahideen cause, Congress continued to up the ante: $250 million in 1985; $400 million in 1987; $400 million in 1988; and $350 million in 1989.
Rhetorical Encouragement
According to Wilson, “It would be indefensible to provide the freedom fighters with only enough aid to fight and die, but not enough to advance their cause of freedom.”
Casey provided similar rhetoric for the changing mission: "Here’s the beauty of the Afghan operation. Usually it looks like the big bad Americans are beating up on the natives. Afghanistan is just the reverse. The Russians are beating up on the little guys. We don’t make it our war. The mujahedin have all the motivation they need. All we have to do is give them help, only more of it."
The Reagan Administration's classification of the Soviets as the “Evil Empire” and its increased military funding turned away from containment and détente. It sought to aggressively roll back Soviet influence in the world, starting with Afghanistan.
Changing Tactics
With fantastically increased funding and changed rhetoric, the CIA still needed to change its operational tactics. In December 1984, Casey said, “Continuation of the current U.S. program will allow the Soviets to wear down the Afghan resistance at a cost affordable and tolerable to themselves.”
But this was not new. Brzezinski had wanted more action during the Carter Administration. In 1981 State Department Policy Planning Council member Francis Fukuyama wrote that the United States needed to supply the Afghan rebels with “large numbers of sophisticated weapons, such as surface-to-air missiles, antitank guided missiles, and land mines,” while also deterring any possible Soviet reprisal by supplying Pakistan with more military aid.
And from Pakistan, agent Hart reiterated Fukuyama’s message, emphasizing the cost effectiveness of using Warsaw Pact weapons and calling for American-made weapons systems in order to cause still greater damage.
Game-changing Stingers
On 25 September 1986, American-made Stinger missiles were used for the first time by the mujahideen, destroying the first three of some 270 Soviet aircraft to be destroyed in the last years of the war. The introduction of Stinger missiles was a watershed for the military balance in Afghanistan. Once the resistance fighters and mujahideen had the weaponry to counter Soviet air strikes and disrupt aerial supply lines, the costs of continued occupation became too much.
Cleaning Up
From the end of the war to 1992, the CIA’s mission was to make sure post-Soviet Afghanistan had little to no Russian-orientation. To this end, the CIA helped various mujahideen, particularly Ahmad Shah Massoud’s loosely knit Northern Alliance, to kill or expel President Mohammad Najibullah (r. 1986-1992).
Funding during the two years immediately preceding the assassination of Najibullah were still incredibly high. The CIA funneled at least $300 million and $250 million to Afghanistan in 1990 and 1991, respectively. Another part of the plan was to continue psychological operations and propaganda. For example, USAID had been given a $50 million grant between 1986 and 1994 for propaganda purposes, namely for school textbooks.
Lastly, to prevent sophisticated American weaponry from falling into the wrong hands, another key mission was Operation Missing-In-Action Stingers, which sought to locate and then buy back or steal Stinger weapons systems in the hands of the mujahideen.
Sources:
Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, New York: Penguin Press, 2004
Alfred McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 2003
Charles G. Cogan, “Partners in Time: The CIA and Afghanistan since 1979,” World Policy Journal 10, no. 2 (Summer 1993)
